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Abstract: Recent work on condi-
tional reasoning argues that denying 
the antecedent [DA] and affirming 
the consequent [AC] are defeasible 
but cogent patterns of argument, 
either because they are effective, 
rational, albeit heuristic applications 
of Bayesian probability, or because 
they are licensed by the principle of 
total evidence. Against this, we 
show that on any prevailing interpre-
tation of indicative conditionals the 
premises of DA and AC arguments 
do not license their conclusions 
without additional assumptions. The 
cogency of DA and AC inferences 
rather depends on contingent factors 
extrinsic to, and independent of, 




Résumé: Des publications récentes 
sur les raisonnements conditionnels 
qui emploient la négation de 
l’antécédent [NA] et l’affirmation du 
conséquent [AC] soutiennent que ce 
sont des formes de raisonnement 
logiquement critiquables mais pro-
bantes, soit parce qu’elles sont des 
applications efficaces, rationnelles, 
quoique heuristiques, de la probabi-
lité  bayésienne, ou soit parce 
qu’elles sont autorisées par le prin-
cipe de preuve totale. Face à cela, 
nous montrons que selon une inter-
prétation prédominante des phrases 
conditionnelles indicatives, les deux 
prémisses des arguments NA et AC 
n’appuient pas leurs conclusions 
sans des prémisses supplémentaires. 
Le bien-fondé ces arguments dépend 
plutôt de facteurs contingents extrin-
sèques et indépendants de ce qui est 
avancé par des arguments DA et AC
 
Keywords: affirming the consequent, Bayesian probability, conditional per-
fection, denying the antecedent, fallacy, heuristics, total evidence 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper addresses two well-known forms of traditionally fal-
lacious inference: denying the antecedent [DA] and affirming 
the consequent [AC] (Hamblin, 1970, pp. 25-27; Kneale and 
Kneale, 1962, p. 130; Sanford, 2003, pp. 19-20). In natural lan-
guage argumentation we nevertheless frequently offer and ac-
cept arguments instantiating DA and AC structures (Evans and 
Over, 2004, chs. 3,4). When is it reasonable to do so? 
 Most extant treatments seek to specify conditions under 
which DA or AC can be cogent.1 Among these, the interpretive 
strategy transforms deductively invalid DA and AC surface 
structures to reveal deductively valid deep structures (Burke, 
1994; Moldovan, 2009). The dialectical strategy, by contrast, 
restricts the function of DA to a refutation by premise denial 
such that DA shows a conclusion to be unacceptable because the 
supporting reasons in the initial argument are rejected (Godden 
and Walton, 2004). Similarly, Woods (2013) specifies defeasi-
ble retraction contexts in which DA-like moves are acceptable. 
 More recent work argues that DA and AC are ordinarily 
cogent because their surface structure can be inductively proba-
tive, and that DA and AC structures may be prudentially em-
ployed when viewed as an application of Bayesian probability. 
Specifically, Stone (2012) argues that DA arguments are proba-
tive and even cogent on the grounds of the principle of total evi-
dence: if an antecedent is positively relevant to its consequent, 
then its negation should be negatively relevant—and sometimes 
sufficiently so. Similarly, Floridi (2009) argues that DA and AC 
can be viewed as applications of Bayes’ theorem that take “in-
formational shortcuts” such as assuming that there are no false 
                                                
1 We use ‘cogent’ to mean well-reasoned: a generic, theoretically-neutral, 
objective, normative standard of argumentative or inferential goodness. A 
cogent argument is one that meets some situationally appropriate standard of 
reason-giving. This standard can be variously explained and operationalized 
(e.g., epistemically, dialectically, etc.) and may properly be informed by fac-
tors that are not purely logical or epistemic, for instance by the practical or 
moral significance of an issue. Generally, cogency is analyzed as premise 
acceptability, relevance, and inferential sufficiency, where these criteria are 
understood to include dialectical adequacy such as successfully surviving 
pertinent criticism or objection. We use ‘incogent’ to mean not-cogent. Fur-
ther, we use the term ‘probative’ to describe an argument or inference that 
provides a reason for its conclusion—that is, its premises provide some quan-
tity of support for its conclusion, even if that support is not sufficient to es-
tablish the conclusion according to some appropriate standard of evidence. 
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positives in the domain of application. These authors conclude 
that ordinarily DA and AC are not erroneous patterns of reason-
ing. 
 Against this, we argue that, on any prevailing interpreta-
tion of ordinary indicative conditionals, arguments that deny the 
antecedent or affirm the consequent fail to be cogent whenever 
they conspicuously fail to cite as reasons the conditions on 
which the acceptability of their conclusions properly depends. 
As we show, the acceptability of the conclusion of DA and AC 
arguments depends on factors not asserted by the stated condi-
tional, for instance the extent to which antecedent and conse-
quent conditions coincide and covary (and likewise with the 
complement conditions). Having made this positive case against 
DA and AC, we move on to show that these recent treatments 
fail to meet their burden of proof, which consists in showing that 
DA and AC arguments as stated are generally cogent. We con-
clude by revisiting the question of whether DA and AC remain 
best treated as fallacious.  
 Section 2 is a brief overview of the issues informing the 
prevailing interpretations of indicative conditionals. Section 3 
reviews extant logical, pragmatic, and dialectical approaches to 
DA and AC. Section 4 illustrates that, on any prevailing inter-
pretation of indicative conditionals, the cogency of DA and AC 
depends on factors not asserted in the stated inference. Section 5 
turns to probabilistic treatments and provides a critical response 
to arguments raised by Stone (2012). Section 6 briefly treats the 
interface between classical logical and probabilistic inference. 
Section 7 offers our conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Interpreting indicative conditionals 
 
Minimally, an indicative conditional of the form a→c ordinarily 
asserts that the truth of its antecedent, a, is incompatible with 
the falsity of its consequent, c, under some appropriate modali-
ty.2 Examples include statements of default rules, statistical reg-
                                                
2 Using the arrow ‘→’ to represent indicative conditionals and the horseshoe 
‘⊃’ to represent truth-functional, material conditionals, we attempt here to 
capture the central connotation of indicative conditionals as ordinarily used. 
This is complicated in unusual cases where antecedents are logically false, or 
where consequents are logically true, or where the antecedent and consequent 
have the same non-logical content (e.g., a→~a). We use the term ‘ordinary’ 
to indicate this limited usage of conditionals and exclude the anomalous con-
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ularities or covariations, as well as presumptive indicators and 
conditions. This suggests a truth-functional interpretation of or-
dinary indicative conditionals (e.g., Bennett’s (2003) “did-did” 
conditionals) on which they are interpreted as material (or Phi-
lonian). That is, a→c can be taken to imply a⊃c, which is 
equivalent to ~(a&~c), ~a∨c, and ~a∨(a&c). On this account, a 
conditional is truth-functionally defined as true whenever either 
its antecedent is false or its consequent is true. Ordinarily, the 
conditionals assert a factually sufficient/necessary relationship 
between their components: 
 
Relationship of a material conditional’s components 
If sufficient condition then necessary condition. 
 
Although there is a prima facie case for mutual entailment be-
tween indicative and material conditionals, interpretative issues 
arise when reading ordinary indicative conditionals as material.3 
We now consider two particular problems that motivate alterna-
tive readings of indicative conditionals in ordinary speech and 
argument. 
                                                                                                     
structions just mentioned, which are aberrant in the course of ordinary con-
versation and reasoning. 
Ordinary uses of material conditionals assert the incompatibility of a true 
antecedent and a false consequent as a matter of fact. Conditionals with a 
stronger modality include necessarily true ones (where the antecedent entails 
the consequent) and counter-factually true ones (that state nomological gen-
eralizations or laws of nature). Though only contingently true, material con-
ditionals are also strictly true—i.e., exceptionless—while conditionals with a 
weaker modality, often called normic (Scriven, 1959), are exception-
admitting, and hence not strictly but normally or generally true, or true by 
default. Such conditionals assert the incompatibility of a true antecedent and 
a false consequent normally, or ceteris paribus. 
3 Supposing indicative conditionals to be truth-functional, the tough entail-
ment is from the material to the indicative. Jackson’s (1987, p. 5) passage 
principle purportedly shows that we ordinarily pass between linguistic for-
mulations involving compounds of negation, disjunction, and conjunction 
that are logically equivalent to the material conditional and those involving 
ordinary conditionals. Jackson’s examples are: (i) “Suppose I am told that 
either the butler did it or the footman did it, then I may infer that if the butler 
did not do it, the footman did,” thus illustrating that we generally take a∨c to 
entail ~a→c; (ii) “Suppose I am told that the butler and the footman are not 
both innocent, then I may infer that if the butler is innocent, the footman is 
not,” thus illustrating that we generally take ~(a&c) to entail a→~c. Edging-
ton (1995; 2009) summarizes various reasons that support or refute a truth-
functional interpretation of indicative conditionals. 
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 First, material conditionals are monotonic: their conse-
quents are not subject to defeat when their antecedents are 
strengthened through additional conditions. 
 
Monotonicity of material conditionals 
If a⊃c, then (a&b)⊃c 
 
Hence, if a is a genuinely sufficient condition for c, then the oc-
currence (or non-occurrence) of another condition b does not 
affect c.4 But the conditionals that we ordinarily rely upon are 
normally subject to a variety of qualifiers (unless-clauses) that 
mark the absence of defeaters. For instance: “If the match is 
struck, it will light, unless it’s wet or there’s no oxygen in the 
room”; “If I promise to be there, I will be, unless I get hit by a 
bus.” For the most part, unstated unless-clauses are presumed to 
apply (or not) as part of our shared background knowledge. In 
other cases, such conditionals are genuinely defeasible—while 
they hold generally, they are subject to exception. For instance, 
birds fly. Hence the conditional “if it’s a bird then it flies” is 
normally true, although penguins, ostriches, and kiwis are ex-
amples of flightless birds. Such defeasible conditionals state 
generally sufficient rather than genuinely sufficient conditions. 
The conditionals we rely upon in such cases, then, are non-
monotonic. They hold ceteris paribus, and so their consequents 
are subject to defeat by some potential defeater, d. 
 
Non-monotonicity of ordinary conditionals 
It is not the case that, if a→c then (a&d)→c; rather, some-
times (a&d)&~c. 
 
                                                
4 This reason seems to work for what we have called the ordinary usage of 
conditionals. Properly speaking, however, the monotonicity of ⊃ is a conse-
quence of its truth-functional definition, which makes a⊃c equivalent to 
~a∨c. Hence, in cases where c is true, the truth-value of a doesn’t matter; 
therefore, conjoining further conditions to the antecedent makes no differ-
ence. In cases where a is false, in contrast, conjoining additional antecedent 
conditions to a will still produce a false antecedent. The logical moral here is 
that the monotonicity of ⊃ does not concern the truth of a consequent when 
an antecedent is strengthened with additional conditions. Indeed, if a⊃c is 
true because a is false, ~c can be added to its antecedent, which may seem to 
prove that a⊃c is not monotonic. But the monotonicity of ⊃ really pertains to 
the conditional relation between a and c when a⊃c is true; and this relation 
remains unaffected if an antecedent is conjunctively supplemented with addi-
tional conditions. We thank John Woods for bringing this to our attention. 
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Some scholars have therefore proposed defeasible modus po-
nens [DMP] as a form of defeasible but presumptive inference 
(e.g., Walton, 2002; 2004, ch.4). DMP operates as a kind of de-
fault inference on the presumption that excepting or defeating 
conditions do not obtain.5 On Walton’s account, DMP does not 
conduct truth from premises to conclusions; rather, it may be 
understood plausibilistically, if not probabilistically, as estab-
lishing a presumption in favor of its conclusion such that the 
burden of proof is shifted from the proponent to the opponent. 
 Second, a compelling intuition has it that the components 
of indicative conditionals must be suitably or relevantly con-
nected, which renders an exclusively truth-functional analysis 
inadequate (Bennett, 2003, ch.2). Such intuitions are standardly 
evoked with the paradoxes of implication (where ‘|-’ means ‘is a 
valid consequence of’). 
 
Paradoxes of implication 
~a |- a⊃c 
c |- a⊃c 
|- (a⊃c)∨(c⊃a) 
 
According to the first paradox, for instance, conditionals with 
contingent antecedents we are inclined to deny end up being true 
regardless of the credence we place in their consequents given 
their antecedents. Counter-intuitively, then, to use an example 
from Edgington (2009), it would be irrational to deny both “The 
Republicans will win” (a) and “If the Republicans win, income 
tax will double” (a⊃c). Supplementing truth-functional accounts 
with Gricean pragmatic considerations can neutralize the para-
doxes at the level of assertion, but they remain problematic at a 
doxastic level (Edgington, 2009). 
 Combined with Frank Ramsey’s insight on what we do 
when reasoning conditionally, these paradoxes have come to 
inform subsequent theories of how conditionals work. 
                                                
5 Gordon, Prakken and Walton (2007) distinguish two kinds of defeating 
conditions that can be viewed as critical questions for presumptive argument 
schemes. An exception is a defeating condition which is presumed not to ob-
tain. Opponents who raise an excepting condition as a rebuttal bear the bur-
den of proof for it, as opposed to merely pointing out its possibility. An as-
sumption, by contrast, marks a defeating condition that is presumed to obtain 
once its possibility is raised. It functions like a normal premise such that, 
when challenged, proponents bear a burden of proof that the assumption 
holds (i.e., that the defeating condition does not obtain). 
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If two people are arguing ‘If p, will q?’ and are both in 
doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their 
stock of knowledge, and arguing on that basis about q; … 
they are fixing their degrees of belief in q given p. (Ram-
sey, 1990 [1929], p. 247) 
 
Ramsey does not understand the schema ‘if p then q’ as a de-
clarative sentence, but rather as a mechanism for belief updat-
ing—a pattern of reasoning. Conditional reasoning, Ramsey 
notes, appears to take the antecedent for granted and then at-
tempts to see what follows. This suggests two alternative inter-
pretations of ordinary indicative conditionals. 
 On a suppositional interpretation, the conditional still ex-
cludes the possibility of a true antecedent together with a false 
consequent. But its truth table is “gappy”—having no truth-
value when its antecedent is false. As Adams (1965, p. 175) put 
it, “a bet that ‘if p then q’ is conditional—in force only if p 
proves true, and in that case winning if q is true, and losing if q 
is false.” Or, as Quine (1982) said: 
 
An affirmation of the form ‘if p then q’ is commonly felt 
less as an affirmation of a conditional than as a condi-
tional affirmation of the consequent. If, after we have 
made such an affirmation, the antecedent turns out to be 
true, then we consider ourselves committed to the conse-
quent, and are ready to acknowledge error if it proves 
false. If on the other hand the antecedent turns out to 
have been false, our conditional affirmation is as if it had 
never been made. (Quine, 1982, p. 21) 
 
Quine’s claim, we take it, is that sometimes utterances of ‘if p 
then q’ do not assert conditional sentences, but are rather condi-
tional assertions of their consequents: ‘q, assuming that p’. 
 A second interpretation that builds on Ramsey’s insight is 
due to Stalnaker (1968), and is characterized by the following 
two tenets. First is a thesis about how deliberation on the truth 
or acceptance of conditional statements should occur. 
 
First, add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of 
beliefs; second, make whatever adjustments are required 
to maintain consistency (without modifying the hypothet-
ical belief in the antecedent); finally, consider whether or 
not the consequent is then true. (Stalnaker, 1968, p. 102) 
 
This view, which also considers belief-revision conditions rather 
than the truth conditions of sentences, agrees with the supposi-
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tional view that indicative conditionals assert “a conditional af-
firmation of the consequent.” Specifically, Stalnaker (p. 101) 
claimed, “[y]our belief about the conditional should be the same 
as your hypothetical belief, under this condition, about the con-
sequent.” According to Stalnaker’s hypothesis (Harper, 1981, p. 
11), then, the credence, C, that we grant to a conditional of the 
form ‘a→c’ should be the same as the ascribed conditional 
probability, P, of its consequent given the antecedent, P(c|a). 
 
Stalnaker’s Hypothesis 
C(a→c) = P(c|a) 
 
The second distinguishing feature of Stalnaker’s interpretation is 
that in situations where a conditional’s antecedent is not satis-
fied, the conditional does not lack a truth-value—rather its truth-
value is indeterminate. In some cases it is true, in others false, 
depending on factors that are not referenced by the conditional. 
Specifically, the truth-value of a Stalnaker conditional with a 
false antecedent depends on the proximity of the state of affairs 
it describes to the actual world. If the described state of affairs 
more closely resembles a world where the antecedent and con-
sequent obtain together, then the conditional is true. Alternately, 
if it describes a world closer to one where the antecedent is true 
but the consequent false, then the conditional is false. Thus, 
while the material conditional is extensional—i.e., it is truth-
functional and can be understood as depending only on stated 
conditions pertaining to the actual world—Stalnaker’s condi-
tional is intensional—depending instead on unstated conditions 
pertaining to the proximity of various possible worlds to the ac-
tual one. For just this reason, Stalnaker’s conditional is also 
called the non-truth-functional interpretation of indicative con-
ditionals. If this interpretation is correct, then the semantics of 
many conditional sentences is properly given by truth-at-world 
conditions, rather than truth conditions. 
 
 
3.  Extant approaches to DA and AC 
 
Both the problems with and our inclination to infer by DA and 
AC were already known to Aristotelian scholarship: 
 
The refutation which depends on the consequent arises 
because people suppose that the relation of consequence 
is convertible. … [S]ince after rain the ground is wet in 
consequence, we suppose that if the ground is wet, it has 
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been raining; whereas that does not necessarily follow. 
(Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 167b1 ff.; cf. Hansen 
and Pinto, 1995, p. 25)  
 
This passage identifies the prevailing explanation of our reliance 
upon DA and AC, namely our tendency to treat the relation of 
consequence expressed in the conditional as reversible or “con-
vertible” (Floridi 2009, p. 398; see Sect. 7 below).6 As it were, 
while a→c is asserted, we allegedly parse the utterance as if the 
converse c→a had also been asserted. But why do we tend to 
treat this relationship as convertible? This question leads to the 
interpretive strategies for legitimating our ostensibly DA and 
AC inferential practices. Such strategies generally try to explain 
away what would otherwise be paradigmatic instances of falla-
cious deductive inference by citing aspects of our linguistic be-
havior. 
 
3.1  Interpretive strategies 
  
A first interpretive strategy is descriptive and begins with obser-
vations about our ordinary reasoning habits, dispositions, and 
practices. Then several moves are available. 
First among these is the recognition that many ordinary and 
perfectly acceptable uses of conditional expressions do not in 




                                                
6 We take convertible to mean that the converse of the stated conditional is 
treated as also asserted. Equivalently, following Adler (1994, p. 227) and 
Moldovan (2009, pp. 323-234), we take reversible to mean that the terms of 
the stated conditional may be reversed thereby yielding the converse of the 
stated conditional. 
We rely on standard terms to denote such relations. Given an original 
expression where a and c are related such that a→c or P(c|a), respectively, 
then  
(i) c→a and P(a|c) denote the conversion of this relation (or ‘the con-
verse’): the relata change places and maintain their truth values; and  
(ii) ~a→~c and P(~c|~a) denote the inversion (‘inverse’): the relata 
maintain place and change truth values; and 
(iii) ~c→~a and P(~a|~c), finally, denote the obversion (‘obverse’): the 
relata change both places and truth values. (Logicians tend to call the 
obverse the ‘contrapositive’.) 
Finally, we refer to a proposition’s negation as ‘the complement,’ e.g., ~a is 
the complement of a, and 1−P(a) is the complement of P(a). 
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“There’s beer in the fridge, if you’re thirsty,” your welcom-
ing host offers. 
You are thirsty. 
Ergo, there’s beer in the fridge! 
 
This is clearly an abysmal inference, but not because of its form 
which seems to validly affirm the antecedent. Rather, the error 
occurs when the offer of beer is mistakenly interpreted as an as-
sertion of enabling conditions for having a cold one. Recogniz-
ing this, we needn’t worry that some (apparent) instances of 
modus ponens are abysmal. 
 Another descriptive move asserts an ambiguity in lan-
guage that would license both deductively valid and deductively 
invalid interpretations of the reasoning involved. For example, 
Fearnside and Holther (1959, p. 156; cf. Horn, 2000, p. 294) 
claim that “In common speech there is the ambiguity of ‘if’, 
which may mean simply ‘if’ or may mean ‘if and only if.’”7 An 
alternative, here, is to adopt a psychologistic stance on the rela-
tionship between our ordinary reasoning proclivities and the 
standards or norms that ought to govern them (cf. Stein 1996, 
pp. 231 ff.). Pelletier and Elio (2005, p. 20), for instance, argue 
that “deductive reasoning has a ‘normative standard’ that is ‘ex-
ternal’ to people whereas default reasoning has no such external 
normative standard…. Here there is no external standard of cor-
rectness other than what people actually infer.” So our untutored 
reasoning performance may be taken to mark not only compe-
tence norms but the very rational standards underlying these 
performances. 
 A second interpretive strategy additionally relies on a 
normative principle of charity to prize non-fallacious but unar-
ticulated interpretations of stated arguments over those that are 
invalid yet directly asserted. For example, Burke’s (1994, p. 24) 
fairness principle, according to which “we [should] not presume 
the presence of fallacy,” prescribes that we should always prefer 
non-fallacious to fallacious interpretations “unless the balance 
of textual, contextual, and other evidence” favors the fallacious 
interpretation. Consider the example: 
                                                
7 Woods (2013, pp. 384-385) considers a similar account of a putatively “not 
infrequent” hyperconditional use of ‘if … then’ as expressing a biconditional 
relationship, noting an ecological demand that we reliably ascertain and track 
relations of, particularly causal, consequence. 
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DA Capital punishment 
 
If capital punishment deterred murder (a), it would be justi-
fied (c). 
Since it doesn’t (~a), it isn’t (~c). 
 
Burke (pp. 24-25) claims that fairness allows us to attribute to 
the arguer the converse, c→a, of the stated conditional, a→c, 
and to interpret her reasoning as a valid, enthymematic instance 
of modus tollens. (Equivalently, one might attribute to the argu-
er the inverse, ~a→~c, of the stated conditional and interpret her 
reasoning as a valid, enthymematic instance of modus ponens.) 
Burke proposes that the stated conditional has a dialectical, ra-
ther than premissary, role of “making clear that the arguer op-
poses capital punishment only because the arguer believes it 
doesn’t deter murder.” 
 As Adler (1994, pp. 273-274) observes, since so much of 
our arguing is highly but appropriately enthymematic (for rea-
sons of both communicative considerateness and cognitive 
economy), non-fallacious interpretations of apparently fallacious 
arguments are almost always easily within reach. According to 
Burke, the upshot is that fallacious reasoning is in fact infre-
quent and what can appear as faulty reasoning is often perfectly 
cogent when charitably interpreted. 
 Charitable approaches to fallacy remediation, however, 
are typically subject to criticism on both descriptive and norma-
tive grounds. As Godden and Walton (2004, p. 227) note, 
Burke’s interpretation does not seem to satisfy his own principle 
of fairness, since 
 
there seems to be plenty of textual evidence to suggest 
that the arguers in these [Burke’s] cases are asserting the 
stated conditionals, while the only evidence to suggest 
that they are asserting the inverse conditional is provided 
by a normatively driven principle of charity. 
 
Their claim is that putatively charitable principles of reconstruc-
tion are not purely hermeneutic if they presuppose a standard of 
rational goodness that is imported into the argumentative situa-
tion under analysis. A purely hermeneutic principle of charity 
would rather seek empirical evidence from what the arguers 
themselves say and do to determine the norms that these arguers 
take themselves to be committed to or to have adopted. 
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This leads to a more general descriptive problem with chari-
table approaches. As Adler (1994, p. 275) writes: 
 
An indication that there is something often illicit about 
these non-fallacious alternatives … is that they are gener-
ated only after the fallacy accusation has been made. 
Thus, they are formulated with a prior agenda in mind. 
Rather than being responsive solely to matters of com-
prehension, they are constructed just to fit the case at 
hand. 
 
This suggests that charitable approaches are not genuinely inter-
pretive. Worse, as Adler (p. 274) observes, the availability of 
non-fallacious interpretations alone does not justify our attribu-
tion of some such interpretation to the arguer. Specifically, the 
observation that we treat conditionals as convertible does not 
show that speakers make valid inferences using some hearer-
supplemented premise, rather than make invalid inferences us-
ing their stated premises. As Adler (p. 277) claims, “[t]he attrib-
ution must then correspond to reasoning in the mind of the per-
son criticized.” But this would require data that charitable ap-
proaches tend not to invoke, perhaps because it is typically una-
vailable. 
 Finally, a normative problem also arises because “it is no 
genuine improvement in an argument to secure a better relation 
between premises and conclusion by introducing any assump-
tion, even if the weakest requisite, that is unsupported” (Adler, 
p. 275). This claim is amplified by Stone (2012) who points out 
the following: the same evidential considerations that would un-
dermine the original invalid argument can be used to show the 
unacceptability of the supplemented premise that is employed to 
interpret the argument as valid. Combining Adler’s and Stone’s 
objections yields the following: since the unstated, and perhaps 
unsupported, premise is supplied in order to repair ostensibly 
defective reasoning, this reasoning would be presumptively un-
acceptable. Stone (p. 237) therefore concludes that “strengthen-
ing the conditional in arguments that deny the antecedent does 
not do the logical work that these interpreters assume that it 
does.” Indeed, such interpretive strategies not only fail to reme-
dy the very problem they set out to solve; they also incur a ra-
ther high explanatory cost by collapsing a distinction well-worth 
preserving, namely between a complete but invalid argument 
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with well-supported premises and an incomplete but valid ar-
gument with at least one unsupported premise.8  
 A third interpretive approach, which might be called ex-
planationist, applies to a limited subset of seemingly DA and 
AC structures, and reads them as having an explanatory rather 
than an evidential function. For example, Salmon (1984, p. 132) 
observes that, on a hypothetico-deductive account of scientific 
theories, hypothesis confirmation seems to have the following 
inferential structure: “If hypothesis, then prediction. Prediction 
[is observed to be true]; therefore hypothesis [is inferred to be 
true].” He notes that this crude reconstruction of hypothesis con-
firmation is deductively invalid (p. 132ff.), but that a more ro-
bust reconstruction—one that takes account of alternative ex-
planatory hypotheses and their relative prior probabilities—
instantiates an inference to the best explanation, which is induc-
tively cogent (p. 137). Second, Hitchcock (1995) supplies an 
interpretation on which some arguments having the apparently 
fallacious DA form ‘Every G is H. Because a is not G, a is not 
H’ may in fact be instances of modus tollens. So long as the ini-
tial conditional premise is interpreted as expressing a sufficient 
causal, rather than an evidential, condition, Hitchcock suggests 
that the argument may be read as an enthymematic statement of 
the argument: ‘Every G is H. a is not H. Therefore a is not H 
because a is not G’ (p. 299). By supplementing the stated argu-
ment with the premise ‘a is not H’ the hidden structure of this 
argument becomes one of denying the consequent (rather than 
the antecedent), and the initial argumentative text states an ex-
planatory condition rather than an evidential one. One can readi-
ly agree with this explanation, but should nevertheless note that 
these interpretative moves do nothing to rehabilitate DA and AC 
arguments per se. When viewed as reconstructive moves, more-
over, they remain susceptible to the same general problems as 
the other interpretive strategies already discussed. 
 Rather than assume that any logical work is done when 
conditionals are treated as convertible, a range of pragmatic ap-
proaches have been developed for the same explanatory pur-
pose. We now turn to these. 
                                                
8 Such considerations have led some theorists away from charity as an inter-
pretive principle. For instance, Paglieri and Woods (2011a) argue that there 
may be other (and better) redemptive strategies than charity and that enthy-
mematic argumentation is best interpreted with a principle of parsimony not 
charity, concluding (2011b) that argument interpretation should not be 
viewed as a reconstructive process. Similarly, Lewiński (2011) argues that 
charity produces an interpretive inequity in dialectical contexts. 
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3.2  Pragmatic grounds for conditional perfection 
 
Geis and Zwicky (1971, p. 562) coined the term conditional per-
fection for a “tendency of the human mind … to ‘perfect condi-
tionals to biconditionals’” such that “[a] sentence of the form 
a⊃c [after being perfected to yield (a⊃c)&(c⊃a) invites an in-
ference of the form ~a⊃~c” (notation adapted). Using the exam-
ple: 
 
(1) If you mow the lawn, I’ll give you five dollars, 
 
they (p. 562) claim that the utterance of (1) invites the inverse 
inference that (2): 
 
(2) If you don’t mow the lawn, I won’t give you five dollars. 
 
They proceed (p. 565) to argue that “what we have called invited 
inferences constitutes a special class of [Gricean] implicatures,” 
and claim that the invited inferences involved in conditional per-
fection are hence justified unless the hearer has reason to think 
otherwise. 
 While not being logical in character, pragmatic considera-
tions do regularly justify our inferences. For example, a speak-
er’s assertion that p normally gives a hearer sufficient reason to 
infer that the speaker believes p, even though there is no logical 
contradiction in supposing otherwise. Sentences of the form ‘p, 
but I don’t believe that p’ are consistent, yet their utterance re-
sults in a performative inconsistency known as Moore’s para-
dox. 
 Similarly, assertions like (1) implicate sentences like (2) 
(van der Auwera, 1997a, 1997b; Horn, 2000). Here’s how. Con-
sider propositions of the following forms ordered on a scale 
such as: 
  
Scale of implication and implicature 
 
If p, q and if r, q and if s, q 
If p, q and if r, q 
If p, q  
 
Implication flows down this scale. Because any proposition on 
the scale entails all below it, the higher up the proposition sits, 
the more informative it is. By contrast, implicature flows up the 
scale: assertion of some proposition on the scale conversational-
ly implicates the falsity of all propositions sitting higher on the 
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scale. Presuming that Grice’s (1989, p. 26) maxim of quantity—
“make your contribution as informative as required (for the pur-
poses of the exchange)”—is followed, asserting a proposition 
lower on the scale thus implicates that the speaker was not in a 
position to be more informative, that is, she could not have 
truthfully asserted any proposition higher on the scale. Such as-
sertions then invite the inference that propositions higher on the 
scale are false. 
 This has come to be called scalar conversational implica-
ture (SCI) and is taken to pragmatically justify conditional per-
fection. One is invited to infer that all conversationally relevant, 
unstated sufficient conditions do not apply. Hence, the stated 
sufficient condition is implicated to also be necessary, thereby 
strengthening the asserted conditional to a biconditional (van der 
Auwera, 1997a, p. 197). Previously, Strawson had attributed 
such inferences to “a ‘pragmatic’ consideration, a general rule 
for linguistic conduct … that one does not make the (logically) 
lesser, when one could truthfully (and with equal or greater lin-
guistic economy) make the greater, claim” (Strawson, 1952, p. 
179; cf. Horn, 2000, p. 305).  
 Finally, Moldovan (2009, pp. 318 ff.) observes that so 
long as conditional perfection can be pragmatically justified by 
SCI, then inferences that apparently and fallaciously deny the 
antecedent or affirm the consequent will be valid in just these 
cases. This makes such pragmatic accounts ultimately norma-
tive, distinguishing valid from fallacious instances of (ostensi-
bly) DA or AC reasoning, although the relevant distinguishing 
features are to be found through interpretive pragmatic consid-
erations. 
 
3.3  Normative, dialectical approaches 
 
In contrast to interpretive approaches, Godden and Walton 
(2004) offer a normative, dialectical approach that specifies an 
argumentative context in which, they claim, denying the ante-
cedent is cogent. The relevant context is dialectical: an opponent 
rejects a conclusion (advanced by a proponent) by denying the 
antecedent of the proponent’s modus ponens inference. Here, 
DA functions as premise denial. 
 When used in this way, Godden and Walton claim, DA is 
a legitimate argumentative move, although its characteristics set 
it apart from standard deductive inference. They specifically 
treat DA as a rebuttal, or a counter-argument, that cannot with-
out further ado be used to establish claims. Godden and Walton 
thus agree with standard accounts that 
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(DAF) a⊃c, ~a |- ~c 
 
is a fallacious form of argument. By contrast, they claim that 
“[t]he conclusion of the counter-argument is not that we should 
accept not C, but rather that we should not accept C for the rea-
sons given in the initial conditional argument” (p. 239, emphasis 
in original). Thus, they (p. 232) propose legitimate applications 
of DA to have the following form: 
 
(DAL)  a⊃c, ~a |≠ c 
 
where |≠ is read as ‘from which it does not follow that’. Alt-
hough they claim that |≠ c, which is neither a theorem nor a 
commitment, “does not have any logical consequences whatso-
ever” (p. 232) (e.g., it cannot be used as a premise in further ar-
gument), DAL as a form of argument nonetheless has both an 
epistemic and a dialectical effect.  
 Its epistemic effect is to show the unacceptability of some 
claim, c, on the basis of a specific but unacceptable reason, a. Its 
dialectical effect is twofold: (i) it requires either that c not be 
admitted, or that it be retracted as a commitment in the argu-
mentative dialogue; (ii) it compels the proponent to find another 
sufficient reason for c in order to advance her case. Overall, 
DAL has an argumentative effect similar to that of presumptive 
argument, namely shifting the burden of proof, here from the 
opponent back to the proponent. 
 
3.4  Defeasible retraction contexts 
 
Similarly, Woods (2013, pp. 253-254) demonstrates how some-
thing resembling denying the antecedent can legitimately occur 
in defeasible retraction contexts when new information is added 
to a premise set which occasions (i) the denial of an antecedent 
(that, in this case, is some member of an initial premise set), to-
gether with (ii) the retraction of a consequent (in this case, a de-
feasible consequence of the initial premise set). Woods adds 
that, properly speaking, this is not a case of denying the ante-
cedent because the consequent is not given up on the basis of 
denying of the antecedent. Rather, the consequent is retracted 
because the consequence relation between the antecedent prem-
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4.  The fallaciousness of DA and AC: The preliminary case  
 
Having reviewed extant treatments we now provide a prelimi-
nary case for the fallaciousness of DA and AC arguments on 
any prevailing interpretation of indicative conditionals, begin-
ning with their interpretation as material conditionals. In doing 
so we begin to identify those conditions that tend to remain un-
stated in DA and AC arguments, but on which their cogency in 
fact depends. 
 It is well-known that, DA and AC being formally invalid 
(see Godden and Walton 2004, pp. 220-223), adding DA and 
AC to the repertoire of acceptable inference-licenses is ruinous 
to a logical system.9 This, though, needn’t show that DA and 
AC arguments are fallacies in the sense that they conspicuously 
fail to provide adequate reasons for their conclusions. Generally, 
a cogent argument explicitly cites as reasons the conditions on 
which the acceptability of its conclusion depends. But with DA 
and AC arguments more is involved than the antecedent’s false-
hood or the consequent’s truth. This is best appreciated visually 
and at the same time serves to move our discussion towards 
probabilities.  
 Following Sanford (2003, pp. 93-100), let a unit line rep-
resent the total probability space and divide the line such that 
the proposition φ and its complement ~φ fill two regions propor-
tional in size to their respective probability.10 The resulting par-
tition visually represents the relative probability of the proposi-





                                                
9 Consider, for example, the following derivation: 
(1) (a & ~a) ⊃ (a ∨ ~a)  (A theorem of the propositional calculus) 
(2) a ∨ ~a                        (Another theorem, the bivalence principle) 
(3) a & ~a                        (1,2 AC) 
10 Limit cases occur when φ is a logical truth, thus occupying the entire prob-
ability space, and when φ is a logical falsehood so that ~φ occupies the entire 
probability space. 
11 Sanford introduces this visualization by adapting a method employed by 
Adams (1975, pp. 9-11) where modified Venn-diagrams represent probabili-
ties within a universe (or domain of discourse). The areas circumscribed are 
proportional to the probability of the conditions demarcated. Edgington 
(1995, pp. 261 ff.) and Jeffrey (2004, pp. 10-11) similarly employ a box dia-
gram. 
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Figure 1. Unit line showing two propositions (a, c) and their 
logical complements (~a, ~c) partitioned proportionally to the 
relative probability of each. 
 
Because a material conditional a⊃c only excludes a&~c, the a-
region must be properly contained within the c-region (as in Fig. 







Figure 2.  a⊃c is false since the a-region exceeds the c-region 
(as indicated by the circle). 
 
The material conditional makes no claims about: (i) the size of 
the a-region relative to its complement, (ii) the size of the c-
region relative to its complement, nor (iii) the proportion of the 
c-region occupied by the a-region. The material conditional only 
claims that the a/~a partition must fall within the c-region or 
coincide with the c/~c partition. 
It is easy to see that the cogency of DA and AC arguments 
depends entirely on independent matters that further qualify this 
containment relation.12 Cogency increases to the extent that the 
a/~a partition lines up with the c/~c partition, as indicated by the 




                                                
12 Recall our use of the term ‘cogent’ to mean well-reasoned (see fn.1). 
Granting that DA and AC are deductively invalid forms of argument, we al-
low that there can, nevertheless, be cogent, yet invalid forms of argument. 
Some invalid arguments have more probative merit than others, and some-
times the degree of probative strength provided by an invalid argument can 
meet some situationally appropriate standard of evidence (Godden, 2005). 
We proceed to explore the cogency of DA and AC arguments by detailing the 
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Figure 3.  DA and AC arguments becoming more cogent as par-
titions line up. 
 
To the extent that the a/~a and the c/~c partitions coincide, the 
converse conditional c⊃a will also be true. In such cases, DA 
and AC deny necessary and affirm sufficient conditions, respec-
tively, and their cogency is thereby explained. 
However, the incompatibility of a true antecedent with a 
false consequent is also satisfied when the separation between 
the a/~a and the c/~c partitions is vast. DA and AC are now ob-








Figure 4.  DA and AC arguments becoming more fallacious. 
 
The probative weight of denied antecedents and affirmed conse-
quents thus depends on conditions not asserted by the condition-
al. Therefore, DA and AC arguments as stated are not proba-
tive—they fail to provide reasons for their conclusions—unless 
such assumptions are explicated and met. In order to responsibly 
rely upon and to properly assess the cogency of DA and AC ar-
guments, these extrinsic factors should not only be satisfied in 
fact but then should also be explicitly stated in the (reconstruct-
ed) argument. 
The relevant information, however, tends to be drawn from 
background knowledge. For example, consider the true condi-
tional: 
 
(3) If something is an orchid, then it is a plant. 
 
The merits of DA or AC arguments using (3) vary depending on 
whether the universe of discourse (or the context of discussion) 
is limited to the flowerage in an orchid show or all the fauna in 
nature. This applies equally to conditionals that do not involve 
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(4)  If its battery is dead, the car won’t start. 
 
Here, the merits of DA or AC arguments using (4) will vary de-
pending on a host of conditions constituting the general mechan-
ical condition of the car. 
 
4.1  Weakening the conditional 
 
We now proceed to interpretations on which indicative condi-
tionals are weaker than the material conditional and argue that 
weakening the conditional to a defeasible, probabilistic or plau-
sibilistic one alone does not improve the case for DA and AC. 
 A defeasible conditional merely refrains from asserting a 
fully sufficient/necessary relationship between its antecedent 
and consequent conditions; its meaning therefore amounts to an 
unspecific, partial exclusion of true antecedents with false con-
sequents. So while the a-region is normally (or mostly) con-
tained within the c-region, a defeasible conditional allows for 
exceptional (or excepting, or a minority of) cases in which a can 







Figure 5.  Weakened conditional. 
 
Conditionals weakened by defeasibility not only make modus 
ponens and modus tollens “risky” inferences, they do not sup-
port DA and AC inferences either. Here again, DA and AC ar-
guments are not probative when their merits are taken as based 
only on their stated claims. Whatever our tolerance for inferen-
tial risk, the cogency of a DA or AC argument with true premis-
es will minimally depend on the extent of the coincidence be-
tween the ~a and ~c conditions, or the c and a conditions re-
spectively. Yet both of these factors are not asserted by, and in-
deed remain independent of, the stated premises of DA and AC 
arguments. 
 Worse still is to interpret the conditional suppositionally 
such that cases where the antecedent is not satisfied are exclud-
ed. Suppositional conditionals still assert that for all cases where 
the antecedent is satisfied so is the consequent, as in Fig. 6 (cf. 
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Figure 6. Suppositional interpretation, where the shaded area 
indicates cases excluded by supposition. 
 
Here, no inferences are licensed when the antecedent is denied. 
Also AC arguments are problematic because the conditional is 
only invoked, or applicable, when its antecedent obtains. Hence, 
affirming the consequent becomes trivially valid rather than 
probative. In this case, then, it is not that DA and AC arguments 
fail to be probative; rather they are entirely inept. 
 Stalnaker conditionals fare no better in this. Given their 
intensional semantics in cases where their antecedent is false, 
their truth-value in these cases also depends entirely on factors 
not referenced by the conditional, specifically on the relative 
proximity of the world envisaged by the conditional to an actual 
world where either both the antecedent and consequent obtain, 
or to one where only the antecedent obtains but not the conse-
quent. Hence, the ability to make a DA inference with a Stal-
naker conditional—let alone its cogency—depends on condi-
tions not stated in the argument. Similar problems beset AC ar-
guments made with Stalnaker conditionals. On extensional valu-
ations (where the antecedent is true), AC inferences are trivially 
valid. On intensional valuations (where the antecedent is false), 
as with DA inferences, the truth of the conditional depends on 
factors not referenced by the conditional itself. 
 In sum, it must be granted that DA and AC are formally 
invalid patterns of argument. Based on the case just made, we 
take it to be (presumptively, at least) established that DA and 
AC arguments are prima facie incogent on non-deductive, de-
feasible, suppositional, and intensional interpretations of the 
conditional also. Generally, DA and AC arguments fail to cite 
among their premises the conditions on which the truth of their 
conclusions properly depends, that is, they fail to give reasons. 
We now consider whether recent probabilistic treatments can 
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5.  Recent probabilistic treatments 
 
Recent scholarship presents DA and AC arguments as probative, 
even cogent, in probabilistic contexts. We will first review an 
argument by Stone (2012) and in the following section turn to 
Floridi (2009).  
Stone takes DA arguments to have force well beyond un-
dermining an opponent’s position. 
 
The premises of an argument that denies the antecedent 
… can have the logical force of an inductive argument, 
meaning that if the premises are true the conclusion 
probably follows. In undermining the opponent’s position 
this form of argument provides reasons for believing that 
the position is false. … Denying the antecedent is a legit-
imate and effective inductive argument strategy. (Stone, 
p. 329, italics added) 
 
In reviewing this case, we point to complexities that remain un-
der-described by the verb ‘can’, above. On Stone’s view, DA 
arguments may have probative weight, albeit probabilistically, 
so that one could allegedly use them to establish claims. 
 
Whereas they [Godden and Walton, 2004] maintain that 
the force of this type of argument [i.e., a DA argument] is 
only that we should not accept the conclusion C for the 
reasons given in the initial conditional argument, I think 
its force is that we should probably accept not C … In 
other words, I think that denying the antecedent has in-
ductive strength. (Stone, p. 343).13 
 
Stone offers three supporting arguments for his claim. We brief-
ly address the first and engage with the third at some length. The 
second (pp. 346-348)—which invokes work by Floridi (2009) 
                                                
13 Stone equates rejecting a claim c with (probably) accepting its logical 
complement non c, whereas Godden and Walton, as we saw in Sect. 3.3, take 
rejecting c to be consistent with either accepting non c or with taking no posi-
tion. They claim that DA can be used legitimately as a way of withdrawing 
commitment from, or denying commitment to, a claim and thereby rejecting 
it. 
Stone writes: “If denying the antecedent can be a legitimate argumenta-
tive strategy to reject a position, then it follows that it can be used to establish 
the improbability of a position” (p. 343). This claim is in need of qualifica-
tion (see below). For instance, skeptical arguments may serve to reject claims 
without establishing any. 
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who presents AC and DA as “quick and dirty” Bayesian infer-
ences or bets on probabilities values—is taken up in Section 6. 
 
5.1  Converse conditionals again 
 
Stone’s first argument (pp. 343-346) relies on insights already 
considered above. As we saw, adding a converse conditional to 
a fallacious DA argument repairs it, thus making the inference 
valid. But as Stone reminds us, the same evidential considera-
tions that would defeat the initial DA inference—thus showing 
it to be invalid—will also show the supplemented, converse 
conditional to be false. Evidentially, then, the initial DA argu-
ment cannot be worse off than the reconstructed modus tollens 
argument. Hence, if the repaired argument is a good one, as the 
standard view has it, so is the initial DA argument. 
 Stone’s insight is correct but it fails to support his conclu-
sion. On the standard view, repairing a fallacious DA argument 
by adding its converse conditional makes the argument valid 
rather than cogent. After all, argument cogency requires both 
acceptable patterns of reasoning and acceptable premises. But 
just as the validity of the initial invalid inference relied on mate-
rial not expressed in it, the cogency of the repaired argument 
also relies on an unsupported and presumptively unacceptable 
premise.14 
 As Stone (rightly) points out, adding the converse condi-
tional only relocates but does not resolve any underlying prob-
lem with the initial argument. His critical claim is that interpre-
tive approaches to repair DA arguments are normatively ineffec-
tive because they fail to resolve evidentiary defects in the initial 
argument. But this insight hardly suffices to establish DA rea-
soning as cogent. Rather, it serves to stress that the cogency of 
DA arguments and their reconstructed surrogates stand or fall 
together and depend on considerations not articulated in either. 
Moreover, it is already widely recognized that DA arguments, 
being invalid, can be cogent given that their converse condition-
                                                
14 Stone’s argument does not pose a serious objection to Godden and Wal-
ton’s (2004) normative dialectical approach, or to Moldovan’s (2009) norma-
tive pragmatic approach. After all, the former does not ascribe the inverse 
conditional to a speaker in order to repair an ostensibly fallacious argument. 
And the latter licenses DA or AC only when there are pragmatic grounds to 
take the inverse conditional to be true and the speaker to be committed to it, 
namely when conditional perfection is pragmatically licensed by scalar con-
versational implicature (see Sect. 3.2). 
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als are true (i.e., when the conditions being stated as sufficient 
are also necessary). As the issue is whether our habit of treating 
conditionals as convertible is ever rational, treating that habit as 
evidence for its own rationality begs the question. 
 
5.2  Stone’s total evidence argument  
 
Stone’s third argument (pp. 348-349), the total evidence argu-
ment, claims that treating DA merely as a form of refutation or 
counter-argument, à la Godden and Walton (2004), undervalues 
its probative merits. Stone holds (correctly) that DA can be used 
not only to refute claims but also to support their logical com-
plements, albeit probabilistically. So just as, according to modus 
ponens, the truth of an antecedent counts towards the truth of its 
consequent, according to the principle of total evidence the in-
verse also holds: the falsity of an antecedent should count to-
wards the falsity of its consequent. 
 
The probability that one of my beliefs is true is based on 
the body of evidence that I have to support it. Notice, fur-
thermore, that it [my belief] is made more probable by 
additional evidence. In the same way in which adding 
true beliefs makes the claim they support more probable, 
subtracting beliefs that have been found false makes the 
claim less probable in relationship to the overall body of 




From an epistemic point of view, it is reasonable to con-
clude that denying the antecedent has inductive strength. 
It captures the way in which diminishing the body of evi-
dence on which a claim is based makes the claim less 
probable. Where C is a claim which has been supported 
by some reasons, the force of denying the antecedent is 
not only that we should not accept the conclusion C for 
the reasons given in the initial argument, but that we 
should probably accept not C. (p. 350) 
 
The total evidence argument, of course, can only apply to non-
demonstrative inferences. After all, if deductive validity is de-
manded as a standard of evidence, then DA and AC are plainly 
invalid. The semantics of the material conditional, as we have 
seen, stipulates that the falsity of an antecedent is compatible 
(i.e., consistent) with either the truth or the falsity of its conse-
quent, and similarly that the truth of a consequent is compatible 
with either the truth or the falsity of its antecedent. So DA and 
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AC arguments cannot generate informative deductive conse-
quences. 
 
5.3  Evaluating the total evidence argument 
 
To evaluate Stone’s argument in probabilistic evidential con-
texts, recall that a conditional ordinarily asserts the incompati-
bility of the truth of its antecedent, a, with the falsehood of its 
consequent, c, under some appropriate modality. We can ignore 
trivial cases where this incompatibility is due to a logically true 
consequent or a logically false antecedent, which only leaves 
cases where a and c are contingent. 
 Suppose then that a→c is interpreted probabilistically. 
Moreover, suppose the weakest possible proponent commitment 
in this context: namely, that a provides some support to c, as ex-
pressed in (5), where Pi(c) marks the initial or prior probability, 
and Pf(c) marks the final or posterior probability. 
 
(5)  Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) 15 
 
When probabilistic support is measured over the closed interval 
from 0 to 1, a degree of support for some proposition φ entails 
the degree of support for its complement via P(φ)=1−P(~φ). 
Moreover, Pi(c|a) is given by the principle of conditionalization 
(PC), that is, the definition of conditional probability: 
 
(PC)  Pi(c|a)=P(c&a) / P(a) 
 
Since P(c&a)=P(a|c)P(c), PC yields Bayes’ theorem (BT)16 to 
which we return in Sect. 6. Now dropping the subscripts, BT 
comes in two equivalent versions. 
 
                                                
15 (5) says that the final or posterior probability of c, Pf(c), equals the condi-
tional probability of c given a, Pi(c|a), and that the latter is greater than the 
initial (i) or prior probability of c, Pi(c), which is the probability of c before 
and independently of having considered the probability of a. This inequality 
characterizes the probability of a as being positively relevant to that of c, so 
that the former can confer support upon the latter. But (5) leaves open the 
exact degree or extent of such support; one of its measures, S(c|a), can be 
defined as: S(c|a)=Pi(c|a)−Pi(c)>0 (Korb, 2003, p. 44; cf. Howson and Ur-
bach, 1993, p. 117, notation adapted). 
16 One reaches BT* by substitution in BT, since 
P(a)=P(a|c)P(c)+P(a|~c)P(~c). 
 
Denying Antecedents and Affirming Consequents 
 




(BT)    P(c|a)=[P(a|c)P(c)] / P(a) 
(BT*)  P(c|a)=P(a|c)P(c) / [P(a|c)P(c)+P(a|~c)P(~c)] 17 
 
According to Stone, “subtracting beliefs that have been found 
false [i.e., our ~a] makes the claim [our c] less probable in rela-
tionship to the overall body of evidence” (p. 348). With mere 
retraction, the support for c can, in the absence of a, only de-
pend on the prior probability Pi(c). So if conditionalization on a 
results in Pi(c|a)>Pi(c), as stated in (5), then retracting a leaves 
the support for c at the prior value, Pi(c). (This is what Walton 
and Godden’s claim in Sect. 3.3 amounts to when expressed 
with probabilities.) Stone, however, is concerned not with re-
traction but with subtraction of a, i.e., conditionalization on ~a. 
So he would be committed to (6), which we call Stone’s total 
evidence thesis: 
 
(6)  Pf(~c)=Pi(~c|~a)>Pi(~c) 18 
 
Already in genuinely probabilistic contexts, where 
0<P(φ)=1−P(~φ)<1, the inequalities in (5) and (6) do, of course, 
depend on suitable probability values. But these values need not 
be unproblematically available in a given natural language con-
text.19 At any rate, (5) and (6) do not express general truths 
                                                
17 P(a|c) and P(a|~c) express likelihoods, namely the probability of a given c, 
and the probability of a given ~c, respectively. P(a|c) can be read as the im-
pact of a on P(c). P(a|~c) is also known as the false positive rate. To express 
modus ponens with BT, if a⊃c is true, then P(c|a)=1. So the rate of excep-
tions, P(~c|a), is zero because P(c|a)=1−P(~c|a). Generally, a probabilistic 
modus ponens inference depends only on P(~c|a), while probabilized modus 
tollens, DA and AC inferences additionally depend on P(a) and P(c). See 
Oaksford and Chater (2008; 2009). 
18 (6) says that ~a is negatively relevant to c because ~a makes ~c more 
probable than it was initially. 
19 Assume for the sake of argument that the proponent assigns 0.5<Pi(a)<1, 
so that a is more probable than not, and that she moreover chooses the likeli-
hood, Pi(a|c), such that Pi(c|a) is rendered sufficiently high for her purpose 
(e.g., beyond some threshold, t; see below). But now assume further that she 
remains uncommitted to the exact value of Pi(c). Therefore, Pi(c) can range 
over all values that satisfy Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) given her likelihood, Pi(a|c). In a 
probabilized dialectical scenario analogous to Stone’s case, assume finally 
that the proponent responds to the opponent’s objection by adopting the op-
ponent’s claim that 0.5<Pi(~a)<1. To evaluate the consequences of this move, 
one now needs to conditionalize on Pi(~a) in order to find Pi(~c|~a). Because 
of the proponent’s loose stance on Pi(c) before hearing the opponent’s objec-
tion, however, that Pi(a)>0.5 and that Pi(c|a) was deemed sufficiently high 
simply does not entail a definite value for Pi(~a|~c), nor of course some such 
value that—upon conditionalization on ~a—also leaves Pi(~c|~a) sufficiently 
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about probabilistic support relations between antecedents and 
consequents come what may. Therefore, particularly Stone’s de-
sired conclusion—that ~c is sufficiently probable given ~a—
won’t follow from each and every gung-ho assignment of prob-
ability values even if 0<P(φ)=1−P(~φ)<1.20 Moreover, if—as per 
Stone’s example—Pi(a) and Pi(~a) are assigned the values zero 
or one, then premise subtraction remains ill-defined in the con-
text of Bayes’ theorem. After all, when P(a)=1, then a is treated 
as indubitable, upon which the theorem ceases to offer guidance 
for the subtraction of a. In fact, subtraction of something that 
qualifies as being beyond doubt is widely treated as an arational 
move in this context, that is, a move on which BT provides no 
rational guidance one way or another. 
 Rather than employ BT in order to address premise sub-
traction, one can turn to Jeffrey conditionalization (JC): 
 
(JC)  Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)Pf(a)+Pi(c|~a)Pf(~a) 21 
 
In Stone’s case, when the proponent claims that a makes c more 
probable she can be taken to be committed to Pf(c)>t≥Pi(c), 
where t is a threshold given by a probability value arbitrarily 
smaller than Pf(c) and at least as large as Pi(c). Further, if 
Pf(a)=1 and so Pf(~a)=0, i.e., a is true, then JC reduces to its left 
hand summand: 
 
                                                                                                     
low. But this value is needed to solve the corresponding instance of Bayes’ 
theorem, namely: Pf(~c|~a)=[Pi(~a|~c)Pi(~c)]/Pi(~a). See Sober (2002). Our 
efforts below are oriented towards supplying information that renders the 
opponent’s claim that Pf(~c|~a)>Pf(c|~a) acceptable. Extending this footnote, 
Zenker (2015) provides a dialectical treatment which relies on material in this 
section. 
20 It is beyond the scope of this article to provide an analytical characteriza-
tion of the bounds that arise when 0.5<P(c|a),P(~c|~a)<1, so that both P(c|a) 
and P(~c|~a) count as probabilistically supported or probabilistically con-
firmed if 0.5<P(a),P(~a)<1. See Oaksford and Chater (2008; 2009), Sober 
(2002), and Wagner (2004) for related work. 
21 The posterior probability of the conclusion, Pf(c), here depends on the pos-
terior probability of the antecedent, Pf(a)=1−Pf(~a), as well as on the prior 
probabilities Pi(c|a) and Pi(c|~a). Jeffrey conditionalization generalizes the 
Bayesian theorem; BT corresponds to the limiting case where one summand 
of JC is set to 1. To verify, recall that Pf(c)=Pi(c|a). Since 
P(a&c)=P(c&a)=P(a|c)P(c)=P(c|a)P(a), by substitution, if Pf(a)=1, then the 
expression Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)Pf(a)+Pi(c|~a)Pf(~a) reduces to Pf(c)=Pf(a&c), and so 
Pf(c|a)=P(a|c)P(c)/P(a) becomes Pf(c|a)=Pf(a&c). The case is analogous when 
Pf(~a)=1. 
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 (7)  Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)Pf(a)>t 
 
As an assumption of relevance (AR) that will be crucial for 
Stone’s argument, we take the proponent’s initial claim—that a 
raises the probability of c to a value above some threshold t—to 
entail the following:  
 
(AR)  If also ~a raised the probability of c, then it does so at 
most to t, so that Pi(c|~a)≤t.  
 
If, as per Stone’s case, a is now subtracted because a is false, 
i.e., if Pf(~a)=1 and so Pf(a)=0, then—analogously to (7)—JC 
reduces to its right hand summand: 
 
(8)  Pf(c)=Pi(c|~a)Pf(~a)≤t 
 
Because Pi(c|~a)=1−Pi(~c|~a), it follows for the standard thresh-
old of probabilistic support t=0.5 that upon retracting a, i.e., 
Pf(~a)=1, the value of Pf(c) falls below t only if Pi(~c|~a)>t. (To 
assume that Pi(~c|~a)>t for t=0.5 amounts to a probabilized ver-
sion of the conditional perfection strategy, discussed in Sect. 3, 
because the assumption renders the conditional convertible, 
probabilistically speaking). The cogency of Stone’s total evi-
dence argument, therefore, depends not only on the initial as-
sumption Pf(c)>Pi(c), as stated in (5), but additionally depends 
on (AR)—i.e., Pi(c|~a)≤t for t=0.5—which effectively states 
Stone’s desired conclusion. After all, once Pi(c|~a) falls to or 
below the value 0.5, then c no longer receives sufficient proba-
bilistic support in the event that ~a, since—analogously to (8)—
we have it that Pf(~c)=Pi(~c|~a)P(~a), and so if P(~a)=1, then 
Pf(~c)=Pi(~c|~a). 
 Hence, rather than Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)>Pi(c), as in (7), the pro-
ponent would have had to be committed to: 
 
(9)  Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)>t>Pi(c) and Pi(c|~a)≤t, for t=0.5  
 
for the opponent to establish probabilistic support for ~c by sub-
tracting a.  That much, of course, may have been intuitively 
clear all along. The point of the exercise was to trace the as-
sumption that remained implicit, extrinsic to, and holding (or 
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5.4  Total evidence and the cogency of DA 
 
We have so far argued that even in cases where a supports c—
by making c more probable than it was initially—the subtraction 
of a, i.e., the acceptance of ~a, only supports ~c provided a spe-
cific relation holds between prior probabilities and the standard 
threshold of probabilistic support, 0.5. Thus, the total evidence 
argument does not hold without further qualification. But might 
the total evidence argument perhaps hold in cases where a prob-
abilized version of modus ponens is cogent? After all, if 
Pf(c)=Pf(c|a)>0.5>Pi(c), then Pf(c|a)>Pf(~c|a), since 
Pf(c|a)=1−Pf(~c|a). So is DA a cogent form of inference in such 
circumstances? According to Stone, it would seem so. Recall his 
claim (p. 350, notation adapted) that: 
 
Where c is a claim which has been supported by some 
reasons, the force of denying the antecedent is not only 
that we should not accept the conclusion c for the reasons 
given in the initial argument, but that we should probably 
accept not c. 
 
Accordingly, Stone would thus be committed not only to the 
view that denied antecedents offer support to negated conse-
quents—i.e., to (6)—but also to the stronger claim that, because 
of this, DA is a cogent probabilistic form of inference. We now 
proceed to show that this claim is also in need of qualification. 
 For DA to be a cogent opponent-move, as we have seen, 
the proponent must be committed to (9). That is, the reasons, a, 
must provide sufficient probabilistic support for the conclusion, 
c. This requires first that, in case P(a)=1, a make c more proba-
ble than its complement, ~c. And second it requires that, if 
P(~a)=1, then ~a make ~c more probable that its complement, c. 
Both conditions can be stated as follows: 
 
(10)   Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)>0.5>Pi(~c|a) and  
 Pf(~c)=Pi(~c|~a)>0.5>Pi(c|~a)  
 
Now, (10) is not a consequence of Stone’s total evidence thesis, 
as stated in (6), let alone a consequence of (5). Rather, (10) de-
pends on the case and so is always contingent relative to what 
has been claimed so far. Consider a standard 6/49 lottery where 
6 numbers on a ticket must exactly match 6 numbers randomly 
drawn out of 49, irrespective of order. The following conditional 
is true: 
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(11) If the first number on your ticket doesn’t match (a), 
 then it isn’t a winning ticket (c). 
 
Here, modus ponens and modus tollens are cogent, indeed 
sound, inferences. But denying the antecedent, i.e., setting 
P(~a)=1, is clearly abysmal. While the odds of winning this lot-
tery improve seven-fold provided the first number matches, they 
nevertheless remain at nearly two million to one against. So the 
second conjunct in (10) is false because in this case: 
Pf(~c|~a)<0.5<Pf(c|~a). Similar things hold for AC, i.e., when 
setting P(c)=1. The odds of matching the first number are rough-
ly 1 in 6.74; fewer than 13% of nearly 14 million losing tickets 
will have matched the first number, so Pf(~a|c)<0.5<Pf(a|c).22 
 Such cases occur when the antecedent states a uniquely 
satisfied, genuinely sufficient condition for the consequent 
which, by contrast, is widely and variously satisfied. For exam-
ple: 
 
(12) If someone is the president of the United States, then 
they are born an American citizen. 
 
Given the size of the US population, the effect of an unsatisfied 
sufficient condition or a satisfied necessary condition on our to-
tal evidence is practically negligible. Hence, even in cases where 
the total evidence principle holds—i.e., where ~a is positively 
relevant to ~c—DA fails to be a cogent form of inference unless 




6.  The greener approach to logic? 
 
Before concluding, we briefly return to Bayes’ theorem (BT) 
and address a contribution by Floridi (2009) that is invoked by 
Stone’s second argument. Recall BT* (see Sect. 5.3): 
 
                                                
22 As already noted, probabilistic versions of conditional arguments generally 
depend on features not stated in their premises. Particularly modus ponens 
(MP) depends only on P(~c|a), while modus tollens (MT), DA and AC addi-
tionally depend on the distribution of the prior probabilities P(a) and P(c) 
(Oaksford and Chater, 2008; 2009). Hahn and Oaksford (2012, pp. 286 ff.) 
describe the distribution of priors that make DA inferentially stronger than 
MP. 
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(BT*)  P(c|a)=P(a|c)P(c) / [P(a|c)P(c)+P(a|~c)P(~c)]  
 
When P(a|~c)=0, then the denominator, 
 
  P(a|c)P(c)+P(a|~c)P(~c),  
 
reduces to P(a|c)P(c), since P(a|~c)P(~c)=0. Now being identical 
to the numerator, P(c|a)=1/1=1. So if P(a|~c)=0, then P(c|a)=1. 
Hence, “Bayes theorem is degraded to a double implication: 
a↔c, c |- a” (Floridi, 2009, p. 399, notation adapted), which is a 
deductively valid inference. Moreover, it can easily be verified 
that “if there are some false positives, that is, if P(a|~c)>0, then 
P(c|a)<1 and the formula bears a strong family resemblance to 
the AC fallacy: a→c, c |- a” (ibid.).23 The case for DA is analo-
gous. So Floridi can call both AC and DA “Bayes’ theorem 
stripped of some of its probabilities” (p. 400). 
 
DA and AC … assume (and here is the logical mistake) 
that there are no false positives (double implication), or 
that, if there are, they are so improbable as to be disre-
gardable (degraded Bayes’ theorem). So DA and AC are 
Bayesian “quick and dirty” informational shortcuts. 
(2009, p. 400) 
 
We can only agree and add a reminder: if P(a|~c)=0, then we 
have left the realm of probabilities and can reason by classical 
logic. The term ‘Bayesian’ is at this point perhaps a mere ges-
ture. The cogency of DA and AC when P(a|~c)>0, however, still 
depends on the distance of P(a|~c) from 0. That distance indi-
cates how large a bet we make when we ignore the probabilities, 
whatever they are. But how small a difference might leave DA 
or AC cogent forms of argumentation thus comes to depend also 
on factors such as the stake size (i.e., the cost of getting things 
wrong) and one’s adversity to losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Blamey, 2013). What Floridi has (nicely) called a “green-
er approach to logic,” then, remains a trade-off between getting 
the probabilities right for some purpose and getting to a conclu-
sion with a minimum of cognitive effort for some other purpose. 
 Stone (2012, esp. p. 341) correctly presents the basics of 
Floridi’s argument. But he appears to slide between two incom-
                                                
23 If P(a|~c)>0, then the summand of BT*’s denominator, 
P(a|c)P(c)+P(a|~c)P(~c), will be non-zero. The denominator now exceeds the 
numerator, P(a|c)P(c), and so P(c|a)<0. 
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patible commitments, viz., that the false positive rate is a rele-
vant magnitude and that it is not. This leads Stone to slightly 
overstate his conclusions, which he bases on the following ex-
ample of a DA argument:  
 
If Carl embezzled the college funds, then he is guilty of a 
felony [P(c|a)=1]. 
Carl did not embezzle the college funds [P(~a)=1]. 
Therefore: Carl is not guilty of a felony [P(~c)=1]. 
(Copi and Cohen, 2009, p. 300, notation adapted) 
 
Stone states:  
 
For the opponent to respond to our [DA] argument … by 
providing counter arguments that Carl might be selling 
drugs in the next county or that he might be guilty of a 
felony DUI24 [i.e., pointing to the uncertainty of P(c|~a)] 
is easy but irrelevant. If the [DA] argument … includes 
reliable evidence that Carl did not embezzle the funds 
[i.e., P(~a)=1], then the argument goes to establish that 
Carl is not guilty of a felony in light of the limited proba-
bility that Carl is guilty of some other felony.25 So the 
Bayesian analysis supports the view that denying the an-
tecedent can be an effective inductive argument strategy, 
especially in response to another argument. (Stone, 2012, 
p. 341; italics added) 
 
As we have seen, P(~c|~a)=1−P(c|~a). Therefore, the probabil-
ity that Carl is not guilty of a felony given that he did not em-
bezzle the college funds, P(~c|~a), depends directly on the prob-
ability of Carl being guilty of some other felony, P(c|~a). So 
P(c|~a) being “limited,” i.e., taking a very low value, is a crucial 
assumption. Whether being invoked in response to another ar-
gument or not, it better be true. Discourse participants may of 
course be aware, or may easily come to know or believe, that 
P(c|~a) is very low in some context. For purposes at hand, they 
can therefore leave that condition implicit. But the cogency of 
DA arguments depends on it just the same. 
                                                
24 DUI stands for ‘driving under the influence’ of alcohol, which in some US 
states may be treated as a felony rather than a misdemeanor, for instance in 
the repeated case. 
25 Stone’s conclusion could be expressed as P(~c|~a&h), where h is some 
plausible function of P(c|~a) that might otherwise be referred to as hope or 
trust. 
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Floridi (2009) had argued for the cogency of DA and AC 
largely on grounds of cognitive and epistemic ecology, a.k.a. 
our bounded rationality (Simon, 1956). 
 
[L]ogic has been guilty of an ‘ungreen policy,’ by con-
sidering some formal logic fallacies as absolutely worth-
less rubbish, only fit for the conceptual junkyard … 
[T]here is a greener and much more reasonable interpre-
tation of such fallacies, which shows that they can be ra-
ther useful, if quick and dirty, and probably riskier, ways 
to gain and manage one’s information. Some logical fal-
lacies are not mere mistakes of no value but information-
al shortcuts that can be epistemically fruitful if carefully 
managed. (p. 318, italics added) 
 
Although they are fallible, quick, and dirty, DA and AC are here 
presented as effective heuristics. When well-managed, or so is 
the claim, they can be suited to our epistemic environments giv-
en our cognitive resources and goals. Their cogency, however, 
as Floridi also points out, depends on several conditions. He 
mentions the soundness of a→c, a relevant connection between 
a and c, and further constraints such as the mutual exclusivity 
and exhaustiveness of a-events over the sample space, and a 
non-zero probability of c-events (Floridi 2009, p. 323). While it 
may thus seem that little management is required, such assump-
tions are in fact substantial. As we have shown in detail, these 
assumptions should be checked carefully if things of great (prac-
tical) importance depend on them. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
7.1  Recap 
 
Having surveyed extant treatments of DA and AC (Sect. 3), we 
made a preliminary, presumptive case that on any prevailing in-
terpretation of indicative conditionals (reviewed in Sect. 2) DA 
and AC arguments are incogent (Sect. 4). Rather, in whatever 
way indicative conditionals are interpreted, the cogency of DA 
and AC depends on contingent factors that are unasserted by, 
and remain independent of, the denial of antecedents or the af-
firmation of consequents. The unstated conditions needed to 
grant probative force to DA and AC can be summarized as fol-
lows: 
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(i) on defeasible and probabilistic interpretations: probability 
distributions concerning the coincidence (or covariation) 
of antecedent with consequent conditions, and the coinci-
dence (or covariation) of complement conditions; 
(ii) on Stalnaker interpretations: the relative proximity of rel-
evant possible worlds to the actual one; 
(iii) on interpretations as valid but enthymematic arguments: 
the unstated, converse conditional; 
(iv) in contexts of pragmatic justification: the applicability of 
the relevant scale of implicature to license conditional 
perfection. 
 
That the cogency of DA and AC arguments depends on such 
extraneous and unstated conditions challenges recent attempts to 
rehabilitate them as cogent patterns of argument (Sects. 5, 6). 
This scholarship presents DA and AC reasoning as generally 
probative, if not cogent: Stone (2012) on the grounds that DA 
and AC are licensed by the principle of total evidence, and Flo-
ridi (2009) on the grounds that DA and AC can be efficient and 
effective applications of Bayesian probability—“informational 
shortcuts that can be epistemically fruitful if carefully managed” 
(2009, p. 318). Yet, neither argument fully succeeds in estab-
lishing the good inferential name of denying antecedents and 
affirming consequents come what may, since, for all accounts 
we have considered, the premises stated in DA and AC argu-
ments fail to be probative unless they are taken in conjunction 
with additional, unstated, contingent assumptions. 
 
7.2  Enthymemes and managing inferential risk 
 
The case against the cogency of DA and AC might, as one re-
viewer commented, be seen as little more than the accusation 
that DA and AC are enthymematic arguments that are entirely 
cogent when properly reconstructed with some suitable and ap-
propriate condition(s). Since enthymemes are both typical of 
ordinary argumentation and are widely viewed as being ac-
ceptable even though they rely on unstated assumptions, why 
should DA and AC not be granted the same courtesy? Moreo-
ver, as the reviewer went on to claim, empirical evidence sug-
gests that, “with respect to various (alleged) fallacies, people are 
actually well-attuned to unstated factors affecting their cogency 
(or lack thereof).” For example, empirical evidence suggests that 
we monitor unstated cogency conditions for arguments ad hom-
inem (Harris et al, 2012), ad ignorantiam, petitio principii, and 
slippery slope (Hahn and Oaksford, 2007). If something similar 
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were typical of ordinary uses of DA and AC arguments, then our 
claims of their default incogency would be significantly under-
mined. 
 Notice that neither Stone nor Floridi rely on empirical data 
to the effect that we use, or accept, DA or AC arguments infre-
quently, or that we sensitively attend to any of the above condi-
tions when doing so; nor do they argue that DA and AC argu-
ments should be interpreted enthymematically. Rather, Stone 
(2012) argues that DA arguments are probative, and can be co-
gent—not enthymematically, but as stated, that is, without the 
addition of any unstated premises. Similarly, Floridi (2009, pp. 
321 ff.) argues that it is efficient and effective, if not rational, to 
take informational shortcuts like DA and AC in ordinary life, 
and to disregard probabilities such as base rates or false positive 
rates, in order extract useful information from our environments 
in a “quick and dirty” way. While Floridi concedes that these 
cognitive shortcuts are argumentatively disastrous and mathe-
matically calamitous, they are nevertheless presented as power-
ful inferential tools—fairly accurate reasoning shortcuts that get 
things right most of the time, such that we are right to generally 
rely upon them (2009, pp. 324, 322). Here, it is not clear wheth-
er Floridi is most charitably read as saying that we are right to 
ignore (“disregard”) certain probabilities, or that we are right to 
assume that the odds will favor our conclusions. 
 Responding now to a reviewer’s comments, let us clarify a 
couple of points. First, we do not claim that the incogency of 
DA and AC arguments results from that something has been left 
unstated; rather the problem we identify concerns what has been 
left unstated. We do not intend to prohibit the use of enthyme-
matic argument or inference, of course. For example, we fully 
endorse Moldovan’s (2009, pp. 318ff.) analysis according to 
which, first, whenever conditional perfection is pragmatically 
justified by scalar conversational implicature, then inferences 
that apparently deny the antecedent or affirm the consequent 
will be valid, albeit enthymematic, cases of modus tollens or 
modus ponens; and, second, supplementing the stated argument 
with the converse conditional (thereby attributing commitment 
to it to the arguer) is warranted by pragmatic considerations that 
form part of the conversational exchange—something the arguer 
would be aware of—so that attributing commitment to the con-
verse conditional would be justified. 
 Moreover, ordinary inferences and arguments rely on 
common and tacit background knowledge or shared belief. It is 
an ancient insight that arguers can regularly leave information 
unsaid which they may expect their audience to readily “fill in.” 
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“Socrates is a man, therefore he is mortal” provides a classical 
example (see Rapp, 2010). (On Hitchcock’s (1998) ethymematic 
consequence relation, by contrast, no such information would 
even be missing, while the conclusion can still follow definitely, 
if never logically.) More generally, the practicality of communi-
cation requires that more be left unstated than what is actually 
stated, for any communicative exchange. As Fogelin (1985, p. 
3) puts it: 
 
An important feature of these shared beliefs and prefer-
ences is that they lie in the background, unmentioned. 
They guide the discussion, but they are not themselves 
the subject of it. … They provide the framework or the 
structure within which reasons can be marshalled, where 
marshalling reasons is typically a matter of citing facts in 
a way that their significance becomes clear. 
 
Thus, this background of shared agreement doesn’t merely fill in 
the gaps of elliptical reasoning; rather, it makes reason-giving—
indeed communicative understanding—possible. 
 Yet, these features mark important differences between 
the unstated background of agreement in ordinary enthymematic 
argument, and what DA and AC arguments leave unstated. As 
we saw, DA and AC arguments fail to assert the conditions on 
which the truth of their conclusions, and indeed the positive rel-
evance of their stated premises, depend. These are properly con-
strued as reasons, not background assumptions. Premises that 
are unproblematically supplemented to putatively enthymematic 
arguments are, minimally, ones that are reasonably acceptable 
to both arguer and audience, and also accepted by both arguer 
and audience. Only then can one take it for granted that these 
premises are not at issue—that they go without saying. Yet, with 
DA and AC arguments this does not seem to hold. The unstated 
conditions listed above, on which the cogency of DA and AC 
arguments depend, do not ordinarily go without saying. Just as 
we cannot generally presume them to be true, we cannot gener-
ally presume them to be reasonably acceptable to, or accepted 
by, arguer and audience. Indeed, because they give the very 
conditions on which the cogency of the given argument de-
pends, they are precisely the kinds of claims that are, or should 
be, at issue, and should therefore be expected to be found among 
the stated premises of the argument. Finally, Section 3.1 reviews 
the several problems, both interpretative and evaluative, that af-
fect attempts to supplement DA and AC arguments with unstat-
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ed premises that are not obviously among the shared beliefs of 
the arguers. 
 This brings us to the reviewer’s second comment, accord-
ing to which we should presume that the unstated cogency con-
ditions are in fact acceptable to, and reasonably accepted by, 
arguers and audiences on the evidence of experimental partici-
pants who seem to reliably monitor such conditions. Indeed, 
some empirical studies do show that participants’ evaluations of 
particular DA and AC arguments, among them some that were 
enthymematic in the classical sense, map closely onto what a 
Bayesian model singles out as the rational response (Oaksford, 
Chater and Larkin, 2000). For instance, data by Ellis (1991), re-
ported in Evans, Newstead and Byrne (1993), is consistent with 
the interpretation that the most frequent employment of DA and 
AC arguments in the tested contexts occurs when speakers 
communicate promises, threats, and conditional intentions. As 
Perkins (2002, p. 208) notes, “this accords well with a practical 
view of people’s treatment of conditionals: Why declare a prom-
ise, threat or intention unless you do not mean to follow through 
should the condition fail?” For instance, “If you are nice, I will 
buy you candy” (promise); “If you leave the salad, you won’t 
get dessert!” (threat); “If the money arrives tomorrow, we’ll go 
to a restaurant” (conditional intention). Such apparently DA and 
AC structures are presumptively cogent; while they depend on 
unstated factors all the same, ordinary speakers seem to get the 
relevant unstated probabilities right. 
 In response, notice that these cases can readily be inter-
preted as being instances of conditional perfection by scalar 
conversational implicature; so understood, they are examples of 
presumptively cogent inferences. But the question remains 
whether subjects track pragmatic conversational cues (i.e., abide 
by Gricean conversational norms, and expect their interlocutors 
to do the same), or whether they track information that is extra-
neous to the conversational exchange such as base rate or false 
positive rate. 
 More generally, one cannot simply assume by fiat that ar-
guers sensitively track the unstated cogency conditions on which 
DA and AC inferences depend. The empirical evidence purport-
ing to show that arguers do so is, in our view, equivocal and in-
conclusive. Moreover, other empirical evidence suggests that 
arguers instead (or perhaps also) attend to various irrelevant as-
pects of reasoning problems, while neglecting relevant aspects. 
For example, studies of two-premise conditional reasoning show 
that reasoners respond to logically irrelevant aspects such as 
premise order (Girotto, Mazzocco and Tasso, 1997) and to 
Denying Antecedents and Affirming Consequents 
 




whether antecedent or consequent conditions are negated (Evans 
and Lynch, 1973), resulting in the matching bias (Evans, 1998). 
Yet other studies show that reasoners fail to attend to logically 
relevant information. For example, one of the first cognitive bi-
ases to be named, the confirmation bias (Wason, 1966), regular-
ly registers as being alive and well (Nickerson, 1998; Mendela 
et al, 2011). Similarly, base-rate neglect (Eddy, 1982) (which 
can be mitigated, though not eliminated, by presenting relevant 
information in a frequentist format (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 
1995)) remains prevalent and recalcitrant (Barbey and Sloman, 
2007). 
 Overall, we agree with Floridi that DA and AC can be lik-
ened to heuristics: they can be reliable in some limited domains 
of application but become sources of error when applied outside 
of those domains. What is the (most) prudent policy of use in 
this situation? Floridi advises a permissive usage policy, with 
the caveat that the use of such heuristics must be properly man-
aged. We agree with Floridi that DA and AC must be properly 
managed if they are to be used rationally and responsibly, and 
would emphasize this aspect more. After all, it is easy to focus 
on contexts where the cost of error is small. In other ordinary 
situations, however, the consequences may amount to decisions 
between life and death. For instance, the role of cognitive errors, 
including biases and the improper application of heuristics, in 
medical misdiagnoses is well documented (Croskerry, 2003; El-
stein, 1999; Graber, 2005; Mendela et al, 2011; Normal and 
Eva, 2010; Pines, 2006). Further, while debiasing is a uniquely 
difficult task (Kenyon, 2014; Willingham, 2011), at least some 
progress is being made, particularly in fields like medicine 
where the stakes are highest. Interestingly for our present pur-
poses, Croskerry (2003) finds that a principal element of effec-
tive debiasing is “metacognition, a reflective approach to prob-
lem solving that involves stepping back from the immediate 
problem to examine and reflect on the thinking process” (p. 
775). Yet, this aspect of cognitive management is underempha-
sized by the “shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later” advocate of 
heuristics (cf. Floridi, 2009, p. 324). More recent work by 
Croskerry, Singhal and Mamede (2013a, b) concludes that “All 
[effective debiasing techniques studied] share a common feature 
that involves a deliberate decoupling from Type 1 intuitive pro-
cessing and moving to Type 2 analytical processing so that 
eventually unexamined intuitive judgments can be submitted to 
verification. This decoupling step appears to be the critical fea-
ture of cognitive and affective debiasing” (2013a, p. ii58). 
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 A cognitively responsible employment of heuristics would 
not carelessly deploy them outside the domains where they are 
known to reliably apply. Thus, the proper management of our 
logical policies involves more than the psychologistic recycling 
of our cognitive habits and inclinations as norms by document-
ing our cognitive proclivities in domains where they succeed 
and ignoring those where they don’t. Rationality, so conceived, 
is not only irresponsible but unsustainable. Adopting a greener 
view of rationality presupposes that one is already convinced of 
our cognitive reliability, and has access to recognizably good 
starting points for our inferences. But this concedes a standard 
of correctness and inferential goodness that remains external to 
our own psychological states and processes. Having examined 
some of these external standards, whatever probative merits DA 
and AC have on some occasion of use were traced back to fac-
tors not invoked by the DA or AC inferences themselves. There-
fore our prescriptive position is that, if DA and AC are to be 
used reliably and responsibility, then users should be cognizant 
of these unstated assumptions and should evaluate them as part 
of the argument, because these assumptions contribute inelimi-
nably to the argument’s cogency.  
 
7.3  Lack of cogency and fallaciousness 
 
How far does all of this go towards establishing that DA and AC 
are, or remain, fallacies? Traditionally, fallacies are recogniza-
ble patterns of reasoning that we commonly but mistakenly take 
to be cogent.26 It is well documented that people tend to offer 
                                                
26 Contemporary work beginning with Hamblin (1970) does much to amend 
and augment classical definitions and classification schemes, while retaining 
some notion that bears a family resemblance to this basic idea. For example, 
the Woods/Walton account (see, e.g., Woods & Walton, 2007) treats fallacies 
as defeasible patterns of reasoning that can go wrong when improperly used 
(e.g., in inappropriate contexts). From this, Walton (1995, pp. 17ff.) devel-
oped a pragmatic account of fallacy according to which: 
 
fallacies are first and foremost identified as being certain dis-
tinctive types of arguments, as indicated by being instances of 
their characteristic argumentation schemes. … Then the fallacy 
is analyzed as a certain type of misuse of the argumentation 
scheme. … According to the new theory, a fallacy is (first and 
foremost) an argumentation scheme used wrongly. 
 
Similarly, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 162; cf. p. 22, ch.7) con-
sider any violation of the rules of a critical discussion in at least one of the 
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reasons in ways that prima facie instantiate DA and AC patterns 
of inference (Evans and Over, 2004, chs. 3, 4). It used to be the 
case that this, combined with the stereotypicality and formal in-
validity of DA and AC, was deemed sufficient to classify DA 
and AC as formal fallacies. But deductive validity provides an 
inordinately high standard for the cogency of ordinary day-to-
day reasoning, and hence yields a rather low threshold for falla-
ciousness. 
 It is widely recognized, moreover, that our ordinary rea-
soning tasks require neither certainty nor entailment; our toler-
ance for risks in reasoning thus makes deduction an unfit stand-
ard for the evaluation of such reasoning. But can our tolerance 
for inferential risk, together with the fact that DA and AC can 
have instances where their premises and conclusions are true, 
suffice to rehabilitate them as presumptively cogent inductive 
inferences? We argue that it cannot. 
 Firstly, invalid arguments are not forms that entirely lack 
truth-preserving instances. Rather, they are forms whose validity 
cannot be fully relied upon because they have at least one inva-
lid instance. Similarly, fallacies are not forms (or schemata) that 
have no cogent applications. Rather, they are forms whose co-
gency cannot be fully relied upon either—ones where cogency 
in any instance depends on factors not stated in the argument 
itself. Therefore, the erroneousness of fallacies does not require 
that they always lead to error or always fail to provide adequate 
reason. Rather, the relevant reason for their erroneousness is that 
fallacies are unreliably cogent inferences—they do not reliably 
cite as reasons the grounds on which the truth or acceptability of 
their conclusions depend. DA and AC are fallacious in exactly 
this sense. 
 Secondly, we have established the incogency of DA and 
AC arguments on any prevailing account of indicative condi-
tionals and despite the recent arguments of Stone (2012) and 
Floridi (2009). Stone and Floridi have each claimed to show that 
DA and AC are not fallacious—not on the grounds that they are 
infrequent or lack a recognizable pattern, but because they can 
                                                                                                     
four discussion stages to obstruct or impede the resolution of a critical dis-
cussion, and so to amount to a fallacy. 
Here we use the term ‘fallacy’ in a theoretically neutral way, aiming at 
that pre-theoretical sense of fallacy that all theories of fallacy hope to account 
for. Generally speaking, we take fallacies to be stereotypical errors of reason-
ing that are commonly and mistakenly accepted as cogent. Crucially, such 
errors needn’t be logical, e.g., begging the question and equivocation are not 
logical faults. 
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be correct, cogent forms of reasoning, generally speaking. We 
have shown that, without suitable qualification, such claims are 
problematic. 
 We have further identified the source of the erroneousness 
of DA and AC reasoning. The erroneousness of DA and AC is 
not explained by the frequency of counter-examples (i.e., in-
stances where true premises lead to false conclusions), but rather 
by the fact that the premises of DA and AC arguments fail to 
cite as reasons the factors on which the warrentedness of their 
conclusions properly depends. So even in cases where DA and 
AC do result in true premises that lead to a true conclusion, this 
is a matter of accident as far as the inference is concerned. 
Therefore, even though DA and AC do not always lead to error, 
it is bad advice to treat them as cogent or probative by default. 
Hence, we should not presumptively rely upon them, but should 
rather seek information that either justifies or counts against 
their conclusions. 
 Arguments that deny the antecedent or affirm the conse-
quent thus rely upon recognizable patterns of incogent but de-
ceptively compelling reasoning. Shall this be called “falla-
cious”? Well, “what’s in a word?” one might ask. Call them 
what you will! Our claim is that DA and AC inferences, unless 
they are suitably qualified, make for bad arguments that are ep-
istemically irresponsible, seemingly predictable, and likely pre-
ventable. The rational and discursive value of a literacy of the 
fallacies was that it promised to inculcate a set of cognitive hab-
its by which we might recognize such errors of reasoning in our 
own and others’ thought and discourse, and deploy the appropri-
ate, learned error-avoidance procedures. Thus, in as much as we 
find it accurate to classify DA and AC as fallacious, we further 
recommend that it is rationally prudent to treat them as such. 
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